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R FID technology (see the “RFID and the EPC Network” sidebar), which allows wire-less data transmission using radio waves, has attracted significant attention in the fields 
of supply chain and manufacturing, as well as a wide 
range of business applications. RFID’s adoption is 
driven mainly by mandated requirements from ma-
jor market players such as Wal-Mart and the US De-
partment of Defense, and recent technology advances 
in areas such as wireless technologies and electronic 
product code (EPC) network protocols. Standards 
development has further driven RFID adoption. For 
example, advances in ultra-high-frequency RFID 
systems provided the necessary read range for ware-
house applications. RFID can now scan products’ 
tags as pallets move through the warehouse door. The 
technology also helps to ease the workload by scan-
ning cases on high shelves.
Although RFID has the potential to revolution-
ize how businesses operate, its implementation isn’t 
straightforward. Many issues and challenges, includ-
ing security and privacy concerns, high cost, lack of 
universally accepted standards, data integration, reli-
ability, business process redesign, employee resistance 
to change, and technology choice, must be addressed. 
Regarding security and privacy concerns, mainstream 
RFID research has focused on solving privacy issues; 
security in general and data tampering in particular 
are still open questions (see the “Related Work in 
RFID Antitampering” sidebar).1 So far, EPC global 
protocols haven’t adequately addressed these security 
problems. Most RFID data is transmitted in open air 
without prop-
er protection, 
which opens 
loopholes for 
eavesdroppers and attackers2 and introduces threats 
that could hinder large-scale RFID deployment, es-
pecially in the open-loop business environment.
Digital watermarking, an emerging technology 
for data protection, is an inexpensive way to protect 
RFID data from illicit manipulation and duplication. 
In the last few years, researchers have studied fragile 
watermarking schemas for multimedia products and 
systems extensively.3 However, most focus on digital 
images or video and audio data; little work has ad-
dressed RFID data integrity and security issues. To 
the best of our knowledge, Vidyasagar Potdar and 
colleagues’ “Tamper Detection in RFID Tags Using 
Fragile Watermarking” is the first study to propose a 
fragile-watermark solution to detect data tampering 
in RFID tags.4 However, more advanced functional-
ity is necessary to address data-tampering problems. 
Potdar and colleagues considered only data tamper-
ing in RFID tags; they didn’t include the system’s 
robust factors such as watermark length and security 
functions’ secrecy.4 Moreover, their solution doesn’t 
prevent tag forgery or cloning attacks. Other research-
ers have tried to extend the schema with more robust 
factors, such as tamper detection in all areas of the 
RFID tag,5 with secret keys, for tag forgery and clon-
ing.6 Building on these ideas, we present a watermark-
based method to prevent tamper attacks in all areas of 
the RFID network.
A relevant problem in RFID technology is the lack 
of security measures in the wireless communication 
channel between the reader and tag. This article analyzes 
potential data-tampering threats and proposes solutions 
using fragile-watermarking technologies. 
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Possible Tamper Attacks
RFID’s pervasive nature exposes tags to two kinds of 
possible accesses: physical access and RF communica-
tion access. In the former, attackers can rarely tamper 
with the tag without the tag owner’s knowledge. RF 
attacks, on the other hand, can cause potential loss by 
altering data on rewritable memory tags.7 
There are several possible ways to attack RFID 
systems. A program called RFDump showed how 
vulnerable RFID tags are.8 Attackers can easily 
read, alter, or delete tags using an inexpensive read-
er plugged into a notebook. Attacks can occur any-
where in the EPC network, including tags, readers, 
middleware, the EPCIS (Electronic Product Code 
Information Services) repository, the EPCIS accessing 
application, the local ONS (object name service), and 
the enterprise application database. We can classify the 
possible data-tampering attacks into five categories.
RFID Tag Tampering
We can divide tampering attacks on RFID tags into 
six types. In data-impairing attacks, adversaries use a 
reader to change the EPC number on tags in a supply-
chain warehouse or retail store, disrupting business 
operations and causing a loss of revenue. In wrong-data-
insertion attacks, adversaries replace tag data with new 
data containing erroneous values. Such attacks might 
lead to severe counterfeiting. In data-deletion attacks, 
adversaries erase tag data, setting all values including 
the EPC number to zero, to cause a loss of revenue.9 
In tag-cloning attacks, adversaries replicate RFID tags, 
which has proven to be very easy. All the necessary 
equipment, such as software and blank tags, is freely 
available. Tag clones can be used to counteract anti-
counterfeiting measures in passports, drug labels, and 
so forth, and as a preparatory step in a large-scale theft 
scheme.10 In tag-swapping attacks, thieves might replace 
an expensive item’s label with a fake label contain-
ing a cheaper item’s data. This attack has occurred on 
bar codes for years. Tag-spoofing attacks are a variation 
of tag cloning. The only difference is that spoofing 
doesn’t involve physical reproduction of an RFID tag. 
Successful deployment of this attack requires special-
ized equipment that allows RFID tag emulation. Ad-
versaries can use such an attack to access the restricted 
areas, sensitive information, and credentials.9
RFID Stream Tampering
In RFID applications, data is treated as a continuous 
stream instead of static datasets. When data is deliv-
ered over an unreliable wireless network, malicious 
parties can inject erroneous data. Potdar and col-
leagues presented a replay attack during an RFID 
streaming communication in which the attacker uses 
a tag’s response to a rogue reader’s challenge to de-
stroy stream integrity. In such situations, RFIDs can 
be more vulnerable than other applications owing to 
their ability to be read at a distance.
RFID Database Tampering
The back-end database is the RFID system’s back-
bone, and can be accessed at any time. It maintains 
detailed item information as well as tag data, which 
must match the data read from the RFID tag. Attack-
ers might target the database by circumventing the 
organization’s firewall and altering numerical values 
or deleting item data. 
RFID and the EPC Network
R adio frequency identification (RFID) is a set of wireless technologies used to identify, capture, and transmit information from tagged 
objects to enterprise systems via radio waves. Early commercial RFID ap-
plications in the 1970s and 1980s were restricted to relatively few closed-
loop applications—for example, security badges, toll passes, key cards, 
and gas-pump payment systems. Currently, most RFID tagging and 
tracking applications are used for operations in individual organizations.
To take RFID beyond the confines of a single organization and create 
value for the entire supply chain, a few breakthroughs are necessary. First, 
we need an interoperable, standardized way to uniquely identify items in 
the supply chain. Second, we need an interoperable, ideally standardized, 
means to discover and share the data that describes each identified item. 
Most important, we must reduce the RFID tags’ manufacturing costs. All 
of these lead to the electronic product code (EPC) network. 
The EPC network encompasses chip design standardization, employs 
EPCglobal technology, and is compatible with global standards, which 
results in lower RFID tag costs and helps improve supply-chain visibility 
for better control over the logistics process. However, the data storage 
capacity of those low-cost, passive tags is limited. EPC was designed to 
reduce cost per tag to make it more attractive to users. This has intro-
duced considerable resource constraints and makes it difficult to provide 
adequate security measures for RFID. 
One problem is the lack of security measures in the wireless com-
munication channel between RFID reader and tag. Because the wireless 
channel isn’t secure, attackers can eavesdrop at distances of up to several 
meters and discover the EPC stored in the tag.1 Adding the necessary cir-
cuitry and power to the passive tags would increase cost. Although EPC 
Class-1 Gen-2 tags have enhanced security provisions to address some 
concerns, there is room for improvement. In particular, we need to focus 
on tags’ low computational capacity, limited memory, and vulnerability 
to radio frequency access by hidden readers.2
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Electronic Pedigree Tampering
To ensure only authentic products are distributed 
through the supply chain, some regulatory agencies 
require an electronic pedigree for products, especial-
ly for prescription drugs.11 The custody record pro-
vided by an electronic pedigree ensures that products 
were never in the wrong hands prior to consump-
tion.  However, if this e-pedigree is illegally accessed, 
modified, or fabricated, it might be unable to detect 
counterfeit products or shrinkage avoidance.
ONS Data Tampering
ONS can be considered a DNS (Domain Name Ser-
vice) server, so, DNS server security threats, includ-
ing file corruption, unauthorized updates, DNS cache 
poisoning, IP address spoofing, and data interception, 
also apply to ONS.
Tamper Detection  
Using Fragile Watermarking
Again, because the existing research addressing RFID 
data integrity issues using watermarking technologies 
focused only on RFID tags,4,5 we try to extend the 
schema to the entire EPC network, addressing the at-
tack areas beyond RFID tags. 
Tamper Detection in RFID Tags
Because companies set the format of the first three 
Related Work in RFID Antitampering
B ecause RFID tags carry unique item identifiers and details of the product to which they’re attached, tampering with 
them has severe consequences. For example, if pharmaceutical 
tags are tampered with, they could represent the wrong drug 
when scanned by the RFID reader. This could be even worse 
when a smart shelf is coupled with RFID technology, as the 
wrong drugs might be picked up and delivered; it could even 
result in wrong diagnoses.1 It can also raise repudiation issues 
in collaborative environments. To prevent unauthorized parties 
from tampering with information, an effective data protection 
mechanism is necessary.2 
Currently, there are several approaches to detect RFID data 
tampering. We can roughly classify them into four different cat-
egories: symmetric cryptography, public-key cryptography, write 
activity record, and fragile watermarking.3
Symmetric-Cryptographic Method 
In a symmetric crypto system, information is encrypted to ensure 
privacy.4 Any data impairing is detected on decryption, so only 
authorized entities can check it. Wrong data insertion is possible 
only if the attacker has the secret key.
This schema is a simple approach to anticounterfeiting RFID 
tags because no special read/write protocol is required. However, 
it’s feasible only for tags using the ISO 14443 standard. Most 
EPC tags don’t have enough storage capacity to carry encrypted 
information. In addition, this method requires a high level of trust 
among the participants, because the system’s robustness is based 
on the key’s secrecy.
Public-Key-Cryptography Method
Paolo Bernardi and colleagues proposed an authentication ap-
proach based on the RSA encryption standard in which the tag’s 
ID is encrypted and written in the user memory.5 The authenticity 
checking corresponds to decryption of the number in the user 
memory. The tag and the corresponding product are false if the 
result doesn’t correspond to the ID. 
An advantage of this schema is that attackers can’t insert er-
roneous data, because this action requires the knowledge of the 
secret key. In addition, it can prevent data copying, as copying of 
the signature from other tags generates false tags. 
However, the authentication protocols require tags with larger 
memories and long data transmissions. Determining whether 
a tag is original or has been tampered with is impossible, and 
tamper evidence doesn’t extend to other information contained 
in the tag. Authentication schemes based on public-key cryp-
tography for RFID tags without cryptographic capability aren’t 
effective antitampering approaches.
Write-Activity-Record Method
Akira Yamamoto and colleagues proposed a method based on the 
write activity record. In this approach, the RFID tag has a special 
memory area—tag private memory—that the tag can read and 
write but for which RFID readers have read-only privileges.6 To 
check if data was overwritten, the tamper-detection method 
requires checking records in the tag private memory. If there’s no 
overlap, the memory wasn’t tampered with. 
Because only the tag itself can write tag private memory, this 
approach allows the detection of all tampering actions and offers 
robust security solutions. The technology involves no cryptogra-
phy or costly computation; any software can verify overlapping in 
the tag with a simple computation.
However, this method requires RFID tags to have additional 
memory and a special writing protocol. Although it detects all 
tampering actions, it assumes each rewriting operation is possible 
tampering, thus it isn’t suitable for information systems that use 
the same memory area more than once. In addition, it can detect 
only tampering with written memory banks, but never wrong 
data insertion and data copying on unused banks.
Fragile-Watermarking Method 
In “Tamper Detection in RFID Tags Using Fragile Watermarking,” 
Cont. on p. 65
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EPC data fields—used as unique identification for 
header, EPC manager (EM), and object class (OC)—
Potdar and colleagues proposed embedding a fragile 
watermark in the RFID tag’s serial number (SN) par-
tition.4 Building on this idea, we created a modified 
watermarking-based schema for RFID tags, as Figure 
1 shows. The process comprises four stages:
•	Watermark generation. We generate the watermark 
using a secure hash, where K is the secret key used 
in both watermark embedding and detection. The 
header, EM, and OC data act as seeds that generate 
a unique random number of a desired length (in this 
case, 8 bits).
•	Selecting the embedding location. To embed a water-
mark, we have to use some redundant space in the 
RFID tag. However, the header, EM, and OC are 
used for unique identification; modifications of this 
data might conflict with the existing standard. In 
addition, they don’t have enough room. If the man-
ufacturer designs an SN with more than 36 bits to 
embed the watermark, we can use the SN as the 
embedding location. 
•	Watermark embedding. First, we randomly choose 8 
bits from the RFID tag’s SN, which then perform an 
XOR operation with the 8-bit watermark. Water-
marked EPC data is produced, as Figure 1a shows.
•	Tamper detection. The data stored on the header, 
Vidyasagar Potdar and colleagues proposed a tamper-detection 
system based on watermarking technology.1 The fragile water-
mark is generated by performing three one-way functions on the 
header, EPC manager, and object class, respectively. The water-
mark check requires knowledge of its location in the EPC and the 
adopted one-way functions.
The watermarking approach can be an effective low-cost solu-
tion because it requires no special features for RFID tags and the 
communication protocols between reader and tags. In addition, 
it can identify not only whether data tampering has occurred but 
also the location. 
However, this schema has some limitations.3 First, the water-
marking is based on a secret function; if an adversary obtains the 
function, huge modifications will be required. Second, it can be 
applied only to EPC 96-compliant RFID tags. Moreover, it can’t 
prevent tag spoofing or cloning because the data in RFID tags 
doesn’t change any bits in either situation.
Performance Assessment 
Table A summarizes the four RFID antitampering approaches’ 
relative performance. Existing approaches lack robust schemas 
based on low-cost tags and schemas usable for generic applica-
tions. Watermarking-based schemas are an effective low-cost 
solution but should be extended to different kinds of RFID tags. 
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Cont. from p. 64
Table A. Evaluation of RFID antitampering approaches.
Characteristics Symmetric-
cryptograph 
schema
Public-key-
cryptography 
schema
Write-activity-
record schema
Fragile-
watermarking 
schema
Tag requirement Large memory Yes Yes No No
Special memory area No No Yes No
Special reading/writing protocol No No No Yes
Robustness Security mechanism Key secrecy N/A N/A Function secrecy 
No data copying No No Yes Yes
Strong trust with partners Yes No No Yes
Enable correction or update Yes Yes Yes No
Tamper localization No No No Yes
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EM, or OC generates the watermark using the se-
cure hash function. If the header, EM, or OC has 
changed, the generated watermark would differ 
from the one embedded in the SN. Then, we can 
detect tampering easily, as Figure 1b shows.
Although such a system allows tamper detection 
on the header, EM, and OC, it might not prevent tag 
cloning or spoofing because the RFID tag data doesn’t 
change any bits in either situation. To prevent such at-
tacks, we must hide some crucial information on the 
RFID tags. For RFID spoofing detection, we hide 
details of product properties that would be checked 
when the RFID reader scans the tag at the point of 
sale. Because each transponder has a unique factory-
programmed chip SN, or transponder ID (TID), that 
is similar to the unique MAC address of a PC net-
work card, we can use the TID for cloning detection. 
Simple attacks can clone a similar tag SN but can’t 
clone TID without access to hardware manufactur-
ing. So when the manufacturer’s unique tag identifier 
is embedded in the RFID tag, we can detect RFID 
cloning easily.
Hiding the expiry date of pharmaceutical products 
could also prevent the sale of expired drugs.3 For in-
stance, if the RFID reader scans an expired drug, it 
could flash a signal indicating that the drug has al-
ready expired and shouldn’t be sold.
Each time we hide information in the RFID tag, 
it occupies a number of bits of the tag’s SN. Hiding 
more information (including EM, OC, SN, TID, and 
product properties) would greatly reduce space avail-
able for the unique SN, making it infeasible. To solve 
this problem, we propose the Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA) technique, which allows multiple 
watermarks to be embedded synchronously in the 
tag ID’s SN. CDMA has been used widely in digital 
communication systems because of its cryptographic 
security and ability to achieve error-free transmission 
of the watermark in the maximum channel capacity.9 
Figure 2 shows a watermarking system with spread 
spectrum communications. In this case, host data X is 
the communication channel, and multiple watermarks 
act as a signal transmitted through X. After that, the 
random-number SN portion of the RFID tag is re-
placed by the modulated signal, which can be used to 
detect multiple embedded watermarks. Details of this 
schema are outside this article’s scope; we refer inter-
ested readers to “Multiple-Watermarking Scheme of 
the European Article Number Barcode Using Similar 
Code Division Multiple Access Technique.”12
Tamper Detection in RFID Data Streams
There are four typical attacks on the RFID stream data:
•	Content alteration. Attackers randomly or selectively 
modify some parts of the XML structure. 
•	Addition attack. Attackers insert one or multiple 
XML structures into the stream.
•	Delete attack. Attackers delete one or multiple XML 
structures in the stream.
•	Replay attack. Attackers copy a segment of a data 
stream and replay it later to the receiver. 
Researchers have proposed several solutions. A sim-
ple method for detecting RFID stream data tamper-
ing is to embed watermarks into every isolated XML 
structure. Using a secret key K, a secure hash value 
H(i) is first computed as the hash of concatenation of 
all individual hash values of the XML structure’s data 
elements. Because the watermark is embedded in the 
tag ID’s SN, we can detect XML structure modifica-
tion and insertion, but we can’t detect deletion of the 
whole XML structure.11,13 In “Chaining Watermarks 
for Detecting Malicious Modifications to Stream-
ing Data,” Huiping Guo and colleagues proposed a 
fragile-chaining-watermarking algorithm to verify 
the streaming data’s integrity.11 The data is first di-
vided into groups on the fly according to a secret key 
and a synchronization point. A watermark is embed-
ded directly in the least significant bits of all the data 
elements of each group to ensure the data stream’s 
completeness. Watermarks are then chained across the 
current group and next group. Therefore, no matter 
how much data is deleted, it can be detected correctly. 
Header
8 bits
PRNG()K
PRNG()
K
Embedding 
watermark
Generated
watermark
(a)
8 bits
Header
EPC manager
28 bits
28 bits
24 bits
24 bits
36 bits
36 bits
EPC manager
Object class
Object class
Serial number
Serial number
(b)
Parity
check?
Match?
The RFID tag
was not tampered with
No
No
Yes
Yes
Cannot validate
the RFID tag
The RFID tag
was tampered with
Figure 1. Watermarking model for RFID tags. (a) Watermark-embedding and 
(b) tamper-detection processes. The header, electronic product code (EPC) 
manager, and object class data act as seeds to generate the watermark using 
a secure hash function. 
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However, such a schema is limited when used in 
RFID streams. The problem is that the method as-
sumes that a data stream consists of numerical data ele-
ments and can tolerate small distortions introduced by 
embedding in the least significant bits of each data ele-
ment. We can use the method for such applications as 
stock market analysis, sports tickers, and environment 
sensing. But for RFID data streams, data elements such 
as tag ID and antenna can’t tolerate this distortion. Di-
rectly embedding a watermark in the two least signifi-
cant bits in tag ID will cause the ID to no longer be 
unique. And, if one or multiple XML structures are 
inserted or deleted, the synchronization point might be 
added or go missing, thus causing incorrect grouping. 
Because the data is naturally divided into groups 
by individual XML structures, we propose a modi-
fied group-chaining method.6 A watermark is em-
bedded directly in the first n bits of the tag ID’s SN 
in each group to ensure the data stream’s complete-
ness. Then a chaining watermark is constructed on 
the basis of both the current group’s hash value and 
the next group’s hash value, which is also embedded 
in the current XML structure’s tag ID. Such a method 
not only ensures each group’s data integrity but also 
successfully detects when multiple groups are deleted. 
Tamper Detection in RFID Databases 
EPCIS can be used for counterfeit and gray-market 
product detection, shrinkage avoidance, and accurate 
and autonomous unit-level inventory management. 
However, if someone accesses the database without 
authorization, or illegally modifies or fabricates it, 
these advantages might be lost.
In EPCIS, the database relationships contain in-
dependent tuples with little redundancy, and there 
is no enforced relationship between the tuples. This 
presents new technical challenges for fragile database 
watermarking schemas. 
One of the simplest approaches is the tuple-based 
watermark schema proposed in “Tamper Detection in 
RFID-Enabled Supply Chains Using Fragile Water-
marking.”6 We modify some bits of tuples’ attributes 
according to an embedding key to embed watermark 
bits, but the watermark bit embedded in a tuple has 
nothing to do with those embedded in other tuples. 
Although this method can detect attribute modifica-
tion and tuple insertion, it can’t detect tuple deletion. 
To add relationships between the tuples, we have two 
possible options—the group-based watermark schema 
and the chaining-based watermark schema. 
For the group-based watermark schema proposed 
in “Chaining Watermarks for Detecting Malicious 
Modifications to Streaming Data,” all tuples are 
first divided into groups according to the number of 
groups G, the hash value of embedding key K, and the 
primary key tag ID.13 Only those who know K and G 
can determine to which group the tuple belongs. By 
grouping, the tuples are no longer independent, and 
the relationships between them are enforced. Next, 
watermarks are embedded in each group indepen-
dently. Each group has two kinds of watermarks: a 
tuple watermark W1 and an attribute watermark W2. 
For the tuple watermark, we generate the hash value 
using the values of all attributes of the same tuple; the 
attribute watermark is formed according to the mes-
sage authentication code and the same attribute of all 
tuples in the group. In this way, the embedded water-
marks form a watermark grid, which helps to detect, 
localize, and characterize the modification. However, 
because grouping is controlled by an embedding key 
and the number of groups, when one or multiple tu-
ples are modified or inserted, different grouping re-
sults might occur and cause detection failure.
It’s worth noting that if the number of groups 
becomes one, the group-based watermark schema 
becomes the database-oriented watermark schema. 
Header
8 bits
PRNG()PRNG() PRNG()
W2 . . . .W1
K
Image X
Wn
SS modulator
W1
W2
Wn
SS demodulator
EPC manager
28 bits 24 bits 36 bits
Object class Serial number
Figure 2. Code Division Multiple Access watermarking model for RFID tags. We can use this model to detect multiple 
embedded watermarks. (W1 and W2 are watermarks generated by electronic product code data fields.)
Data Tampering
68 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2011
In the database-oriented watermark schema, all the 
tuples are related, and there should be no grouping 
changes, so the embedded watermarks can local-
ize and characterize alterations to the database. But 
if database modifications are necessary, we have to 
compute a new attribute watermark and discard the 
previous one. Generating and verifying the attribute 
watermark is computationally intensive. 
We extend Guo and colleagues’ chaining-based 
watermark schema to fit the RFID database.11 The 
idea is to first embed tuple watermarks in each database 
tuple, then construct a chaining watermark on the ba-
sis of both the current tuple’s hash and the next tuple’s 
hash. In this way, the embedded watermarks are actu-
ally chained so even if the tuple is deleted, the deletion 
is detectable. Although the chaining-based watermark 
schema has good localization capability, it can’t distin-
guish alterations from one other. For example, deleting 
a tuple’s forward chain and backward chain is similar 
to an inserting tuple; therefore, the schema can’t tell 
whether a tuple was inserted or deleted. 
In general, we can classify the watermarking 
schema for a database into four types: tuples-based 
method, group-based schema, chaining-based meth-
od, and database-oriented schema. We examined the 
database watermarking schemas in the open literature 
and summarized their relative performances in terms 
of localization, characterization of alteration, secu-
rity, and update and computational costs. As Table 1 
shows, no database watermarking method can achieve 
all desired security parameters. The tuples-based 
method has low computing cost but bad localization. 
The group- and chaining-based methods have good 
localization, but their characterization of alteration is 
low. And although the database-oriented method has 
good localization and characterization of alteration, its 
computational and updating costs are relatively high. 
Tamper Detection in Electronic Pedigree
E-pedigree can prevent costly mistakes by tracking 
an item. For instance, medical mistakes can be life 
threatening if the medication has been tampered with. 
E-pedigree stays with the drug, and if it goes to a sus-
picious site, informs the pharmacist before the drug is 
prescribed. Regulations allow the use of digital sig-
natures on e-pedigrees so they can be self-authenti-
cated upon receipt, without employing methods that 
require communication with each upstream owner of 
the drug, making it more difficult to tamper with. 
Tamper Detection in ONS
To track down the relevant database, an ONS con-
verts the manufacturer ID stored in the EPC into a 
Web address. These ONS servers work analogously 
to the DNS used on the Internet. For such situa-
tions, a chaining-based watermark schema can be 
embedded in a tag’s SN portion in each ONS tuple. 
Details of tampering detection in ONS are similar 
to EPCIS. 
A lthough RFID adoption is an emerging trend in healthcare and supply-chain management, the use 
of RFID has triggered significant security and privacy 
concerns. This article highlights potential security 
threats especially in the form of data tampering in 
RFID or EPC networks and shows how these threats 
might be resolved using a digital watermarking tech-
nology. Tampering detection is considered one of the 
important enabling technologies for product anti-
counterfeiting, which can be applied to ensure the in-
formation system or network integrity and provides a 
technological foundation for digital forensics.
We intend to carry this research further to apply 
in various application domains, especially in logistics, 
supply-chain management, and healthcare, to help 
ensure integrity in product traceability and confidence 
in product trustworthiness. 
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Table 1. Performance assessment of database watermarking schemas. 
Tuples based Group based Chaining based Database oriented
Localization Bad Good Good Good
Delete detection No Yes No Yes
Modify detection Yes No No Yes
Insert detection Yes No No Yes
Security Low High Low Medium
Update cost One tuple One or two groups Two tuples Whole database
Computational cost Low Medium Low High
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